Security

How safe are we truly when flying? The incident aboard a FlyDubai flight on September 30, 2026 has brought this question to the forefront. According to several testimonies reported after the emergency landing, the co-pilot allegedly attacked the captain with a knife, aiming to hijack or crash the aircraft, before crew members and passengers managed to force the cockpit door to subdue the assailant.

Although aviation security measures have undergone profound changes since the September 11, 2001 attacks, they were mainly designed to deter external threats. Yet, when a crew member themselves seeks to seize control of a plane, the protections are far more limited. This is explained by Jeff Price, an aviation security expert, in The Conversation.

Since September 11, 2001, the cockpit has become a true fortress

Before 2001, cockpit doors did not offer the same level of protection as today. The terrorists who hijacked four airplanes during the September 11 attacks had notably managed to gain access to cockpits and take control of the aircraft. Three planes were driven into targets, while passengers on the fourth attempted to retake the aircraft.

Since then, airlines and authorities in many countries have strengthened several layers of security. The cockpit doors have been reinforced to form a physical barrier against intrusions. Newer aircraft must also feature a second barrier designed to protect the cockpit when its door is open.

Access for crew members to secure areas has also been tightened. In the United States, for example, pilots and cabin crew undergo criminal background checks and security screenings during recruitment. They must also pass through crew-only access points and may be subjected to random physical checks.

Training has also changed. Before September 11, crews were trained primarily to comply with hijacker demands. Now, security training includes self-defense exercises and procedures designed to respond to a hijacking attempt.

In the United States, some pilots can even be armed under the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, created in 2002. To participate, they must complete training and pass weapon-handling requalifications twice a year. The Federal Aviation Administration states that these pilots are authorized to “use firearms to defend against criminal violence and air piracy when they attempt to regain control of an aircraft”.

The most difficult threat to prevent sometimes comes from within

These devices, however, have a major limitation: they are mainly designed to stop an external person from entering the cockpit. They offer far fewer safeguards when a person who is allowed to be there becomes a threat.

A particularly notable precedent occurred in 2015 with the crash of a Germanwings aircraft in the French Alps. The co-pilot prevented the captain from returning to the cockpit after leaving for a bathroom break, before deliberately causing the aircraft to be destroyed.

The FlyDubai episode thus highlights a specific safety challenge: pilots inherently have a very high level of access to the aircraft. Checks conducted before recruitment or random searches can limit some risks, but they do not prevent all actions by a determined person who is already at the controls.

Jeff Price, an aviation security expert, emphasizes this limitation of the system:

“At some point, you have to trust the individuals. It is largely on this principle that the American system rests (as it does for many other countries).”

The FlyDubai incident also draws attention to the cockpit door’s role in emergencies. According to press reports, the injured captain would have been able to unlock it, allowing passengers to enter the cockpit. This arrangement shows that protections can also be used in emergency situations when the crew needs outside help.

Thus, aviation security rests on several successive barriers, but none can completely eliminate the risk. As Jeff Price notes, even the presence of a security agent in the cockpit would not provide an absolute guarantee if that agent themselves were compromised. After more than two decades of strengthening measures against intrusions, the main challenge remains difficult to solve: securing a space without hindering the people who must work there from keeping control.